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Abstract
Fatal road injuries are the eighth leading cause of death globally in 2016 claiming 1.4
million lives. This makes road safety a crucial focus for all countries. One aspect of road safety
receiving attention recently is the growing fatalities and risk to vulnerable road users, namely
cyclists and pedestrians. In recent years, pedestrian fatalities in the U.S. have increased from
4,109 in 2009 to 5,984 in 2016. That is an astounding 45% increase over a 7-year period. The
Netherlands on the other hand has seen a relatively steady decline in vulnerable user fatalities as
well as overall fatalities. We take a look at the historic approach to road safety in the U.S. and
use the Netherlands as a case study for comparison. Both the Netherlands and U.S. hit their peak
fatality tolls in 1972 with similar fatality rates of around 25 fatalities per 100,000 people. After
almost four decades, the United States has drastically deviated with a road fatality rate that is
nearly three times that of the Netherlands, 10.9 and 3.1 (per 100,000 population) respectively.
Part of the reason for selecting the Netherlands is because of their Sustainable Safety vision,
which we believe might be one of the factors driving the sustained decrease in their fatalities.
Using an established comprehensive conceptual framework, we analyze road safety
indicators such as policy, infrastructure, and safety culture, which are influential in decreasing
road fatalities. We looked at the change in risk to pedestrians and cyclists against cars over time
using a user based risk metric that accounts for the number of users at risk on the roads. Our
findings show that risk in the Netherlands has decreased and converged to the point that cars,
pedestrians, and cyclists experience equal risk, 2.5, 2.7, and 3.0 fatalities per 100,000 users
respectively. That is 1.2 and 1.08 times higher risk to cyclists and pedestrians than car users. In
the U.S., vulnerable user risk has diverged compared to car fatality risk. Fatalities per 100,000
users are 8.2 for cars, 59.8 for pedestrians, and 42.5 for cyclists in the U.S. That is 7.3 and 5.2

	
  
times higher risk to pedestrians and cyclists than cars. The nature of the Netherlands system has
decreased the vulnerability of cyclists and pedestrians and made it so that they do not need
armored protection to survive on the street.
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1. Introduction:
Fatal road injuries are the eighth leading cause of death globally in 2016 claiming 1.4
million lives. They are also the number one non-disease or non-health development cause (1).
Just as the healthcare field diligently makes efforts to find cures to diseases and works to prevent
adverse health outcomes, the field of transportation safety must do the same to reduce and
ultimately prevent road deaths. The most recent years have seen smaller increases in global road
deaths suggesting that progress is being made. Yet the continued increase globally points to the
importance of adopting new approaches for tackling road safety (2).
In addition to the emphasis placed on rising road deaths, one aspect of road safety
receiving more attention is the growing fatalities and risk of cyclists and pedestrians. In the U.S.
the risks for these road users are particularly high, nearly 36 times for pedestrians and 11 times
greater for cyclists compared to cars as found in one study (3). In recent years, pedestrian
fatalities in the U.S. have also increased which presents a growing problem in the country and
motivated us to take a closer look at safety for these so called vulnerable users. In 2009 there
were 4,109 pedestrian deaths (12% of total road fatalities) and by 2016 that total had increased to
5,987 deaths (16% of total road fatalities). That is an astounding 45% increase over a 7-year
period.
In this study we seek to identify aspects of road safety, as they relate to vulnerable users,
which might need further attention and development in the road safety policies in the U.S. We
aim to do this by taking a look at the historic approach to road safety in the U.S. and use the
Netherlands as a case study for comparison. This is a country that has performed exceptionally
well when it comes to vulnerable road users.

	
   2	
  
The background to this study is that many richer countries showed increased levels of
motorization around the 1950s and 60s - post WWII. Out of that, road fatalities in these
developed countries increased and eventually peaked around the early 1970s (4). Since then the
fatality trends in developed countries have shown declining patterns. Among those countries,
some of the top performers recognized for their low fatality rates are Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, also referred to as the SUN countries (5). In contrast, the United
States struggles with road fatalities in terms of level of risk as well as in their rate of
improvement (4, 6). Of the SUN countries, we decided to focus on the Netherlands to showcase
some points for road safety where the United States may have room for improvement. One
reason why we chose to compare the U.S. with the Netherlands is because of the increasing
divergence in their safety records over time. They both hit their peak fatality tolls in 1972 with
similar fatality rates of around 25 fatalities per 100,000 people. After almost four decades, the
United States has drastically deviated from the Netherlands trend with a road fatality rate that is
nearly three times the Netherlands rate, 10.9 and 3.1 (per 100,000 population) respectively.
Many countries around the world have begun to adopt a range of policies to promote
transportation safety. Different places are both defining and implementing systems-based road
safety in a way that fits the context of their country. One of the most well-known road safety
visions is Sweden’s “Vision Zero” (7), but other strategies include the Netherlands’ “Sustainable
Safety” approach. Sustainable Safety seeks to prevent road crashes, and when that is not
possible, to prevent severe injury with the overall intent of creating a sustainably safe traffic
system (8). Part of the reason for selecting the Netherlands is because of this road safety vision,
which we believe might be one of the factors driving the sustained decrease in road fatalities in
the Netherlands. Encouragingly, in the United States, there have been a growing number of
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safety visions emerging at different levels, all suggesting that the country is trying to place a
greater emphasis on road safety.
While the Netherlands is recognized for having a pattern of low road fatality rates, they
are also noted for something more, a large share of the Dutch use the bicycle for transportation.
In fact, taking into account non-motorized modes, pedestrians and cyclists, the Netherlands has
one of the largest non-motorized mode shares of any developed countries with a 45% share. On
the other hand, the U.S. has one of the lowest non-motorized mode shares with 6% (3).
Pedestrians and cyclists are two examples of vulnerable users. According to the British planner
Stephen Plowden, “vulnerable users are anyone who takes to the street without armor” (9). Due
to the lack of protection, these users typically have a higher chance of dying in crashes than those
in cars, for example. Counter to what we might expect though, countries with a greater
proportion of vulnerable users have frequently been associated with lower overall fatality rates
(3). In particular, the U.S. has the highest fatality rate per 100,000 people with 10.9 and the
Netherlands one of the lowest with 3.1 among developed countries. Thus, how might a country
where nearly half of its road users are classified as “vulnerable,” be outperforming a country
where the vast majority of its road users are surrounded by the armor of a car?
This paper seeks to address such a phenomenon to form a better understanding of why
the United States has fallen behind in overall road safety. We begin with a literature review in
section 2 on the progression of road safety models and where the models might have limitations.
We also bring in works on pedestrian and cyclist safety and how they tie in with overall road
safety. Section 3 explains the mixed methods approach we use that harnesses both quantitative
and qualitative indicators of road safety analysis. Section 4 is an assessment of different road
safety risk metrics. We critically examine several metrics to demonstrate the most appropriate
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uses for different risk representations. Section 5 presents the national risk trends in the U.S. and
the Netherlands going back to the 1950s to set a historical foundation. Following that we analyze
safety factors within the framework of a conceptual model between the two countries
chronologically in the discussion, section 6. Section 7 presents the trends in risk over time for
three classes of road users, cars, pedestrians, and cyclists. Lastly, section 8 concludes with the
most important lessons to take away for the U.S.

2. Literature Review:
The literature on international road safety shows that the research has progressively
become more comprehensive. Consequently, research on road safety has become more complex
and difficult to model statistically as more variables are considered. In this review we will look
at the literature to see what factors have been used to statistically model international road safety
as well as some work that has focused on why pedestrian and cyclist safety may differ between
the two countries. We also look closely at a theoretical model developed by our research team
that comprehensively identifies indicators of road fatalities. It is important to recognize the
achievements that have been made by statistical modelling in improving our understanding of
what factors shape transportation safety. But as with any analsyis method, statistical modeling
has its limitations. The limitations for statistical models are regarding certain factors that get
omitted. Through a mixed methods approach that uses both quantitative and qualitative data we
hope to bring more attention to the factors that statistical -models may not always capture.
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2.1. International Road Fatality Modeling
Smeed produced the first traffic safety model of traffic fatalities across different countries
in 1949. He considered fatalities as a function of motorization for 20 developed countries (10).
His findings showed that increased car ownership, measured by registered vehicles per
population, positively correlated with traffic mortality rates (measured by fatalities per
population) and negatively with driving risk (fatalities per registered vehicle). In Smeed’s paper,
the U.S., having the largest car ownership, had one of the best rates for fatalities per registered
vehicle, but fared as the worst country in terms of fatalities per population. From these opposite
findings we see the importance of looking at different ways of measuring risk and what different
metrics tell us. Several papers in the 70s and 80s built on Smeed’s work by looking at developing
countries while mainly considering vehicle ownership as well (11, 12, 13). Later, a selection of
literature that looked at safety in several countries brought economics into the analysis, but
focused on one or two indicators at a time. Some examples included looking at gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita in a 2005 paper by Kopits and Cropper (14), as well as unemployment
rates and income in a 2006 paper by Gerdtham and Ruhm (15). Their results showed that good
economic conditions (higher income, higher GDP per capita, and lower unemployment)
correlated with poor road safety outcomes in terms of population based fatality rates.
Among international studies, a group of literature began including several independent
variables in one regression model as more factors were discovered to affect road safety. One
example is a paper by Bester in 2001, which included independent variables for infrastructure,
socioeconomic, and health dimensions (16). The final model included the Human Development
Index (HDI), cars per population, and percent of vehicles that are not passenger cars. The
findings showed that an increase in car ownership and HDI, as well as a decrease in vehicles that
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are not passenger cars, correlated with a decrease in fatalities per 100,000 passenger cars. In the
same year, Page had a study that looked at population, vehicles per capita, percent of young
people, alcohol consumption, and percentage of people in the workforce, among other factors
(17). Page’s results supported that an increase in fatalities correlated with increases in the five
variables formerly listed, and had negative correlations with percentage of urban population and
percentage of buses/coaches in the vehicle fleet. Further expanding from there, a paper by
Ahangari in 2014 looked at socioeconomic factors, travel behavior, vehicle exposure and health
variables (18). His findings supported the results that higher values for unemployment, gasoline
prices and the HDI index correlated with lower fatality rates. Additionally, greater levels of
mobility (miles traveled per vehicle) correlated with higher fatality rates. The increasing
consideration of more road safety determinants in modeling found in this group of literature
shows the need to capture more exogenous variables to better understand the patterns of
international road safety. But, Ahangari’s research went a step further in establishing a
comprehensive framework around which to select road safety variables and to avoid the selection
of ones that are interrelated.
Some research projects aiming to model road safety have created indexes that are based
on a number of variables that can then be used to compare countries. In 2007, Al-Haji created the
road safety development index (RSDI) based on 3 pillars that can be broken down into the
following 8 dimensions: traffic risk, personal risk, changing trends, road user behavior, safer
vehicles, safer roads, socioeconomic level, and police enforcement (19). In 2008 Hermans
developed a road safety performance index based on indicators for 7 dimensions: alcohol and
drugs use, protective systems, vehicle, speed, daytime running lights, infrastructure, and trauma
care (20). A third example of index development was the SUNflower model. The SUNflower
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benchmarking comparisons were established in a 2002 report (5) and the index was presented in
the 2008 SUNflowerNext report (21). SUN stands for Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands, the three countries with the best performing road safety rates at the time. This
report structured the indicators into 4 dimensions: road safety performance, policy performance,
implementation performance, and structure and culture (21). These index-based models are more
comprehensive and were developed through a systematic process to identify a variety of road
safety indicators. This research direction informs the need for a comprehensive structure in order
to understand the many interrelated trends affecting road safety. In the next section we will look
more closely at the structure of a conceptual framework for understanding road fatalities.

2.2. Comprehensive Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework is a systematic way in which to organize the various
characteristics that relate to a phenomenon such as road fatalities. This structure should be
designed to allow for a systematic selection of indicators for use in statistical modeling or for the
selection of countermeasures and safety interventions. One of the earlier road safety frameworks
was the World Health Organization (WHO) systems approach that emphasized safe vehicles,
roads, and speeds (22). This model was used as a basis for developing Ahangari’s comprehensive
conceptual framework. By reviewing Ahangari’s framework, we may begin to identify the areas
where research is lacking and why. Ahangari’s comprehensive conceptual framework is depicted
in Figure 1 featuring eight dimensions (A to H).
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FIGURE 1: Comprehensive conceptual framework for road traffic fatalities. (8)
Ahangari used this framework to compile a list of all factors related to traffic fatalities as
well as to understand the relationships between them. He also used the framework to
systematically select variables for use in his statistical road safety models. This helped to reduce
confounding variables. In his work, Ahangari pointed out that road safety determinants vary
spatially, over time, or with both space and time. By spatially, he referred to factors that vary
between places (8). This includes travel behavior (D in Figure 1), which is reflected in the
common modes of travel used in a country. Also varying from place to place is infrastructure,
such as street design features, and urban form, such as land use or spatial growth patterns (E and
F in Figure 1). Other factors that vary between places are policies established to guide
transportation development and road safety, as well as laws and enforcement that regulate safe
behavior (G in Figure 1). Factors that can affect safety which vary over time and between places
include: socioeconomic variables such as gas prices and income levels, exposure factors like car
ownership levels, changes in technology like vehicle types or vehicle characteristics (A-C in
Figure 1), and crash post-care factors that are dependent on the health care system (H in Figure
1).
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Using this conceptual framework as a guide in his models, Ahangari controlled for
driving levels, car ownership, gas prices, and macroeconomics like unemployment and GDP to
explain the outcomes in traffic fatalities between developed countries. Beyond the selection of
variables, the framework can be used to identify where data are lacking and additional research
analysis is necessary. Some factors that often do not get included in statistical models between
countries include infrastructure, urban form, policies, regulations, and mitigation factors. There
have been a few studies that statistically modeled fatalities against Graduated Driver Licensing
(GDL) Laws (23, 24), seat belt laws (25, 26), density as a measure of urban form (24), and walk
share as a measure of infrastructure design (24), but these studies were using data for the U.S. at
the state level. These omitted factors typically are left out of international models because the
variables needed to characterize them are largely unavailable for comparing different countries.
Rather, they can be captured statistically by constants in the models as we illustrate below with
Ahangari’s statistical assessment. These constants indicate how much of the fatality rate is not
explained by the independent variables, but might be explained by changes in omitted factors (6).
In his 2015 paper, Ahangari ran two panel model regressions on road fatality rates for 16
developed countries. Panel models are a form of time series analyses used to understand changes
over time. The first regression panel model was designed to give an overall traffic fatality (OTF)
index for each country since in this model no controlling variables were included. The second
regression panel model gave an adjusted traffic fatality (ATF) index for each country. In this
case the model controlled for variations in gas prices, amount of driving, car ownership, health
factors, and macroeconomics. The country effects constants in each of the two panel regression
models were a measure of the variables left out of each model. Therefore, the country effects
constants for the OTF represented differences due to all variables that affect traffic fatality, while
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the ATF constants captured omitted variables, such as infrastructure, policies, and safety culture,
which were not included in this second model. Ahangari used the country effects constants from
both regressions to designate indices for each country. These indices represented the safety
conditions in one country relative to all developed countries in his models. A larger negative
index value represented a country with safety levels better than the average of all countries in the
model. A greater deviation from zero in the ATFI than the OTFI represented differences due to
infrastructure conditions, policies, and safety culture (6). The results from Ahangari’s study for
just the Netherlands and United States are depicted in Figure 2.

Road Fatality Index

0.8
0.6
0.4

U.S. - OTFI

0.2

U.S. - ATFI

0

Netherlands - OTFI

-0.2

Netherlands - ATFI

-0.4
-0.6
1990-2000

1995-2004

2000-2010

Figure 2: OTFI and ATFI for the Netherlands and U.S. replicated from Ahangari’s paper. (6)
The indexes from Ahangari’s models can first be used to compare the overall rate of
improvement between countries. Secondly they can be used to compare the rate of improvement
due to omitted factors by looking at OTFI versus ATFI for a single country. To compare the two
countries we’ll look at the adjusted traffic fatality index. The United States started out on par
with other countries in the 90s, indicated by a value close to zero. Over time the U.S. rate of
improvement became worse than other countries, indicated by the positive curve. In the
Netherlands, the rate of improvement in the earlier years was slightly better than most countries,
but over time has further improved. This implies that over time they were reducing fatalities by
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larger amounts than other developed countries. After describing the overall fatality trends, we
now look at comparing the two indexes.
The ATFI showed greater negative values in the 2000-2010 interval, and a more negative
trend over time, than the OTFI in the Netherlands. In the U.S. the ATFI showed greater positive
values in the 2000-2010 interval, and a more positive trend over time, than the OTFI. This
suggests that the Netherlands made greater rates of safety improvement compared to developed
countries when it comes to changes in infrastructure, policies, and safety culture, while the U.S.
has not. The Netherlands had a larger overall reduction in fatalities than the U.S. since the mid1970s. Thus, it is likely that the larger rate of decline for the Netherlands versus the slower one
in the United States was influenced by the approaches taken with infrastructure, policies, and
safety culture. In this project part of our objective is to look at what the Netherlands did in these
areas to see what changes can be made in the U.S. safety approach to increase the rate of decline
in the U.S.

2.3. Pedestrian and Cyclist Safety
In an effort to understand transportation safety, recent literature has begun to specifically
analyze the safety of walking and biking. In 2000, Pucher and Dijkstra found walking and
cycling to be 36 and 11 times riskier respectively than driving in the U.S as compared to
European countries like Germany and the Netherlands, which show a much smaller margin. The
authors attributed the higher safety for these vulnerable modes in Europe to several factors:
infrastructure, urban design, traffic calming, traffic education, police enforcement, and
restrictions placed on automobiles (3).
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Beyond just the safety of walking and biking itself, the literature suggests that places with
more cycling and walking have safer overall road safety in terms of fatality rates (3, 27, 28). A
paper in 2003 introduced the idea of “Safety in Numbers,” i.e. that more cyclists and pedestrians
present in an area would translate to lower fatality rates partly due to a behavioral change in
motorists (27). The author looked at this phenomenon at several levels: for intersections, cities,
countries, and across time periods finding similar trends. However, Wegman reframes this
discussion as ‘awareness in numbers” (28). That is to say that places with higher numbers of
vulnerable users are increasing awareness among motorists of the presence of pedestrians and
cyclists, and therefore drivers expect them on the road. To further support this idea of awareness,
one paper showed that the rate of conflicts drops as the frequency of cyclists increases (70).
However, places where the share of a particular mode increases often are also improving the
facilities for those users, which may be a correlating factor with the safety improvement.
Therefore, it is not simple enough just to say that an increase in cyclist and pedestrian mode
share will improve road safety. Rather, an increase in vulnerable users coupled with supporting
risk-reducing measures may lead to a higher quality of safety.
One final crucial finding in the bicycle and pedestrian literature is from a paper on 24
California cities in 2011 (29). The authors showed that road fatality risk for all road users
generally improved in cities with high cycling rates. A key finding from this study was to not just
look at crash rates, which may indicate that high cycling cities are less safe, but to focus on what
happens after a crash in terms of the severity levels. The high cycling cities showed that crash
severity was lower. This led to the conclusion that the high presence of cyclists not only makes
drivers aware as previous studies indicate, but that the awareness also compels motorists to
reduce their speeds. Crashes happening at lower speeds have a lower chance of resulting in a
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fatality. They also brought in the influence of street design characteristics and their relations to
safer cities, which further supports Wegman’s statement on needing risk reducing measures in
addition to high cycling and walking numbers to produce safer roads.

2.4. Synthesis of Literature
Statistical models in the literature have identified a number of factors that correlate with
road fatalities. Over time more variables were included in statistical modeling to improve their
explanatory powers, however many variables that affect safety are still often overlooked. We
have seen that the literature on road safety comparisons between countries is less extensive when
it comes to factors like policies, infrastructure design, and safety culture. These variables are
often omitted, because they cannot be easily modeled statistically or do not have readily
available data. As a result they are sometimes overlooked as a part of the solution to road safety.
Ahangari’s ATF and OTF indexes suggested that variables like policies, infrastructure, and
safety culture played a more significant role in the decline in traffic fatality for some countries
than others. The Netherlands was one that showed larger safety improvements due to factors like
policies, infrastructure, and safety culture. This was not the case in the U.S. Additionally
literature shows that increases in cycling and walking have corresponded with safer places. This
paper will look at road safety indicators that are overlooked in statistical modeling, but which
impacted the risk to vulnerable users in the Netherlands, to understand some of the divergence in
vulnerable user trends in the U.S. The type of analysis used is a mixed methods analysis.

	
   14	
  
3. Mixed Methods:
A mixed methods approach is a methodology that combines quantitative and qualitative
ways of exploring questions from how the data are collected to how they are analyzed. In this
paper, we use mixed methods because the factors omitted from statistical road safety models
include elements that are quantifiable requiring data that are not readily available, and others that
are qualitative. Looking at Figure 1, the factors that are difficult to quantify between countries
include: travel behavior/risk (D) such as mode share, infrastructure (E) for example differences
in street design approach, and urban form (F) such as housing density. The factors that are more
qualitative include: technological modifications (C) such as in vehicles or those used to monitor
road violations, and moderating/preventing factors (G) like policies, enforcement, safety
education and laws.
Literature on mixed methods states that qualitative and quantitative knowledge could be
used to inform one another, validate similar findings, show divergence in results, as well as
expand on the limitations of one another (30). Qualitative analysis in particular is an established
method in non-engineering literature such as transportation geography (31, 32, 33, 34), but not
frequently used in transportation engineering. Road safety research in transportation engineering
literature is typically rigid with a hypothesis, data analysis, and finally conclusions to explain the
results. Qualitative analysis is a more flexible process where additional information informs
existing knowledge on a topic and then the cycle repeats (30), as has been the case for this study.
For this analysis, we reviewed literature on culture, policy, and infrastructure design as
well as identified historical events that impacted road safety, such as several protests and an oil
crisis. As we learned about design and policy decisions made over the years, we looked at the
raw data on fatality trends to correlate those decisions with patterns in the fatality rates. While
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doing this we identified additional patterns of change in the trends that we then sought to find
explanations for through actions taken. In our paper we will present a qualitative content analysis
of the policies, historical events, infrastructure, and cultural differences between the Netherlands
and U.S. Throughout the paper we will develop a narrative for road safety in the two countries
by presenting the qualitative findings complemented with supporting quantitative data.

4. Choosing the Appropriate Risk Metrics:
Studies on road safety utilize risk or fatality rate measures to compare levels of safety.
Risk is the number of occurrences of adverse events divided by amount of chances for the event
to occur, in other words the exposure (35). In this paper, we use fatalities to represent adverse
road events. Hakkert and Baimaister demonstrated a number of different situations in which risk
can be used to measure safety and they discuss the best metric to use for each comparison (36).
The same fatality data may tell different stories about the level of safety based on different
exposures. Therefore, selecting an appropriate risk measurement for a given study is important to
ensure that meaningful interpretations can come out of the data. This section sets out to explain
some of the risk metrics chosen to measure road safety within this paper.
For international comparisons, an aggregate measure like risk based on population is a
commonly used metric. A population exposure is not based on a specific means of travel, as is
the case with driving distance, and so, represents safety as it affects the entire population. This
measure of risk shows the impact that road fatalities have on public health and is sometimes
called a transportation mortality rate (36). Road fatalities have not typically been addressed as a
matter of public health. However, with large numbers of people dying annually on U.S. roads,
road fatality is a serious public health issue and should at some point be analyzed by a public
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health metric, such as fatalities per 100,000 people (4). This measure acknowledges the
importance of reducing the effect that road fatalities have on the national public health, just as
much as the importance placed on the reduction of major health epidemics for examples.
In this study, a comprehensive overview of road safety must analyze several ways of
measuring risk. This leads to the second aggregate measure for international comparisons.
Distance based risk has long been used as a common metric for road safety. When distance
driven is used as exposure at the country level it shows an aggregate measure of how safe the
roads themselves are in that country, capturing both the level of motorization and the safety
advancements in roads and vehicles. This metric represents the risk of a fatality when exposed to
a certain level of driving. It does not capture all the complexities of the exposure on traffic
crashes in a country, therefore should not be the sole risk measure analyzed. For example, in
focusing on this measure of distance-based risk as the only measure, it is easy to overlook the
fact that an important strategy for reducing fatalities is to reduce the amount of driving. It might
even unwittingly imply the contrary since one way of reducing this risk measure is to increase
the amount of driving.
Another application for risk metrics is for comparing different modes of travel. Using
distance traveled for this comparison, however, might lead to erroneous results since different
modes can have widely varying speeds of travel. With faster modes people tend to travel longer
distances for each trip (and over a lifetime), therefore distance might not be the best measure for
comparing exposure between different modes. Some research has suggested that a risk based on
time exposure might be a better measure because it is a truer measure of the amount of exposure
experienced by users of different modes (35).
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An alternative risk metric used to compare modes is fatalities per estimated users. For
example, in the bike safety study in 24 California cities (29), the number of users of different
modes in the entire population were estimated based on commute mode shares. The risk metric
in this form served as a proxy for analyzing relative safety between modes and over time. It can
be used to compare how much safer one mode has become over another. Larger declines in this
measure might reflect a period when safety conditions for the mode in question improved. We
can then search if there was a greater focus on safer legislation, infrastructure, or policies for the
mode in question than there was for other modes that improved the safety conditions.
Vulnerable users have been a focus of road safety in the Netherlands for many years now
and more recently the U.S. has begun to place an emphasis on them as well. With that in mind,
we felt it important to get an idea of what the impacts have been on different modes. We will
look at the fatality risk metrics for three different classes of road users. In this assessment
vulnerable users include cyclists and pedestrians, with cars used for comparative purposes. As
discussed, modes differ in their speeds; therefore a distance-based metric skews the risk for
active modes relative to cars. We will compare three metrics to demonstrate this phenomenon for
bicycles relative to cars as presented in Figure 3, and for pedestrians relative to cars in Figure 4.
These figures are shown only for the Netherlands since their distance based exposure data is
available annually and by mode for the Netherlands but not for the USA.
For each mode we compute fatalities per billion km using travel survey data and police
registered fatalities (despite undercounting non-motorized modes, these numbers were the
available fatality counts dating back to 1950). We derive fatalities per 100 million hours by
scaling the distance-based risk using an average speed (computed using Netherlands mobility
data) for each mode: 3.3 mph (5.3 kph) for walking, 7.6 mph (12.3 kph) for cycling, and 27.3
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mph (44 kph) for driving (62). Lastly, we take the commute mode share percentages and
multiply them by the total population each year to get an estimated number of users as the
exposure for a third metric. Then we produce graphs of the relative rates of risk depicted in
Figures 3 and 4. From these graphs we can see that the travel time metric closely matches the
trends in the estimated user metric, while the distance based one tells a different story about
relative rates. Using the risk based on exposure time would have been ideal, but due to travel
time data not being explicitly available yearly for the USA, we feel the metric using estimated
users serves as a close proxy for relative mode comparisons. The patterns for cyclists and
pedestrians in these figures appear to tell the same skewed story for distance-based risk.
Therefore, the findings support the idea that distance is not the best exposure for modal
comparison; rather that time is the most appropriate. The fact that mode share based exposure
tracks time exposure remarkably close validates that estimated users is a fitting alternative.

Ratio of Fatality Rates
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Figure 3: Cycling fatality rate relative to driving fatality rate based on 3 measures of exposure in
the Netherlands.
(Data Sources: Survey Travel Behaviour (OVG) and Study of Mobility in the Netherlands (OViN) from Statistics
Netherlands, and the Mobility Study Netherlands (MON) from Centre for Transport and Navigation (DVS), and
BRON.)
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Figure 4: Pedestrian fatality rate relative to driving fatality rate based on 3 measures of exposure
in the Netherlands.
(Data Sources: Same as Figure 3.)

5. National Road Safety Trends:
In this section we will analyze fatality rates from 1950 to 2015 to understand the patterns
of change in road safety for the United States and Netherlands. Figure 5 shows fatalities per
100,000 people, which as we discussed above is an indicator of the health risk to the entire
population due to road fatalities. Figure 6 shows fatalities per 100 million VMT, an indicator of
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Figure 5: Road fatalities per 100,000 population for United States and Netherlands (1950-2015).
(Data Sources. Netherlands: Statistics Netherlands, BRON. United States: FARS-NHTSA, U.S. Census Bureau.)
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Figure 6: Road fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles for U.S. and Netherlands (1950-2015)
based on a Logarithmic Scale.
(Data Sources. Netherlands: Survey Travel Behaviour (OVG) and Study of Mobility in the Netherlands (OViN)
from Statistics Netherlands, and the Mobility Study Netherlands (MON) from Centre for Transport and Navigation
(DVS), and BRON. United States: FARS-NHTSA, U.S. Census Bureau, FHWA.)

Our period of analysis starts in 1950 when the traffic fatality rate in the U.S. was 22
fatalities per 100,000 people, over twice that of the Netherlands at 10 fatalities per 100,000. By
1972 both countries had about the same rates at 26 and 25 per 100,000 in the U.S. and the
Netherlands, respectively. In other words, over the period between 1950 and 1972, the fatality
rate (Figure 5) in the U.S. grew marginally while that in the Netherlands had sky rocketed. The
reason for the increase in fatalities in the Netherlands appears to be due largely to a rapid
increase in travel, post World War II, rather than a decrease in safety (as measured by fatality per
km) on its roads. This is borne out by the data in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 6 shows that in the
period in question, fatalities per 100 million miles decreased in both countries but at a higher rate
in the Netherlands than in the U.S. This decrease in risk on the road however, was overwhelmed
by the increase in driving (see Figure 7) which led to a concomitant increase in fatalities. In the
Netherlands, the 510% increase in annual driving per capita from 1950 to 1972 and was likely
the main reason behind the 220% increase in fatalities. To emphasize just how large these
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increases were in the Netherlands, the U.S. annual driving per capita increased just 99% and
fatalities increased 64% over the same years.
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Figure 7. Vehicle miles travelled per Capita in the United States and Netherlands from 1950 to
2015.
(Data Sources: FHWA, DOT, U.S. Census Bureau.)

This data illustrates the potential problems with using fatalities per VMT as a measure of
traffic safety. In a situation such as in the pre-1970s period when VMT was growing rapidly, this
measure can give a distorted representation of safety. In the case of the Netherlands, the decrease
in fatalities per VMT from 25.9 in 1950 to 10.3 in 1972 is largely a function of the increase in
VMT. This risk measure contradicts what is shown in fatalities per 100,000 people, which is
actually an increase from 10.2 in 1950 to 24.6 in 1972.
Regarding safety, 1972 was a turning point in both countries and fatalities peaked in that
year, at 54,589 in the U.S. and 3,264 in the Netherlands. In both countries the initial down turn
was linked to some decrease in driving that was caused by the oil crisis of 1973 as well as the
emergence of a number of new vehicle technologies. Following the oil crisis, fatality rates in
both countries rebounded but did not approach the 1972 peak. Ahangari documented the impact
of micro-economic factors and gasoline prices on road fatalities rates in the U.S. and other
OECD countries including the Netherlands (18). The pattern was one of decrease and rebound in
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fatalities tied to increase and decrease respectively in oil prices that repeated itself numerous
times over the preceding decades in the U.S. and to a much less extent in the Netherlands.
It is also worth noting the greater rate of improvement in traffic safety as measured by
fatalities per 100 million VMT in the Netherlands than the U.S. since 1972. As discussed before,
in Figure 6 we can see that the Netherlands started at a much higher rate for fatalities per 100
million miles in 1950, roughly 3.6 times greater than the U.S. However, by 1988 they had
matched the rate in the U.S. and since then have continued to decrease at a much higher speed.
This parameter, albeit an imperfect measure nonetheless, suggests that the risk of vehicle travel
in the Netherlands is much lower, almost half, than that in the U.S. today. For the U.S., some of
this metric may be explained by the difference in VMT fatality risk between rural and urban
states that differ in the amount of travel (69).
Since 1972, the Netherlands has seen a steady decrease in two road safety risk metrics,
which also have been accompanied by a steady decrease in actual road fatalities. Conversely, in
the U.S. both road safety risk metrics have also decreased but at a lower rate than in the
Netherlands and have not been accompanied by a consistent pattern of decrease in actual
fatalities. Ahangari’s comprehensive model of road fatality suggests that decrease in risk is the
accumulation of many factors including improvement in vehicle technology, emergency
response, safety policy and infrastructure design. Given the differences in improvement between
the Netherlands and the U.S., many of these factors might have been at play and disentangling
them is difficult. Instead, a more effective safety approach would encompass firstly
acknowledging all of these factors as part of the solution, rather than trying to understand how
these factors affect the decrease in risk individually. Secondly, addressing multiple factors
simultaneously may have a greater rate of decrease in fatalities than single targeted actions. The
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Sustainable Safety vision, formally initiated in 1997, may have played an important part in the
greater rate of fatality improvement for the Netherlands because it embraced these two ideas. In
the following section, we will look at the safety conditions for vulnerable users over time in the
Netherlands and U.S.

6. Modal Trends Based on Number of User
Vulnerable users in the Netherlands make up 24% of all fatalities (125 total) for cyclists
and 11% (60 total) for pedestrians in 2015 (using police registered data). In the United States the
numbers are 2% (818 total) for cyclists and 15% (5,376 total) for pedestrians. Given the results
from Figures 3 and 4 earlier, we can look at the fatalities in the form of rates for three modes,
cars, pedestrians, and cyclists, in the U.S. and Netherlands using the estimated user risk metric
that is derived from mode share. Those results are shown in Figure 8. Infrastructure is an
important factor in mode choice as survey studies, for example, have cited lack of safe facilities
as reasons for users not cycling or taking particular routes (37, 38, 39). It has been found that
when there is an increase in facilities for cycling and walking, there is an increase in cycling and
walking mode shares (40). Given that there is a relationship between mode share and
infrastructure, we feel that fluctuations in the fatality risk based on mode share may reflect
changes in safe infrastructure design over time.

Fatalities per 100,000 estimated users
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Figure 8: Road fatalities per 100,000 users estimated from work commute mode share
percentages and populations (1960 – 2015).
(Data Sources. Netherlands: Survey Travel Behaviour (OVG) and Study of Mobility in the Netherlands (OViN)
from Statistics Netherlands, and the Mobility Study Netherlands (MON) from Centre for Transport and Navigation
(DVS), and BRON. United States: U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Transportation Statistics –U.S. DOT.)

	
  

In the Netherlands, the car fatality rate shows an increase between 1960-1970 when
motorways were increasing. During this time the automobile was taking over urban spaces where
the infrastructure was once designed for a different type of traffic (41). After 1970, the trends for
all modes in the Netherlands begin to decrease, a time when new infrastructure was being built
for cyclists and safer designs were implemented for all users. If we look at the U.S. in the earlier
years, there is an increase in the fatality rate for vulnerable users and a steady, slightly decreasing
trend for cars. This seems to align with increased infrastructure improvements for automobiles
and negligence in infrastructure for other users. What is striking in the U.S. curves is how over
the years, the difference in mode risks mostly grew and the vulnerability of the so-called
vulnerable road users increases relative to that of car users. The difference in safety between all
three modes in the Netherlands, on the other hand, has significantly decreased and has converged
to the point where they are almost equal. Those numbers are 3.0 for cyclists, 2.7 for pedestrians,
and 2.5 for cars. The divergence in the U.S. and convergence in the Netherlands points to a
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difference in infrastructure designs. Specifically, that the Dutch infrastructure design elements
work to improve safety for all users. This supports the work discussed earlier by Ahangari,
which shows that the safety divergence between the USA and the Netherlands attributed to
infrastructure and policy was larger than for other determinants of safety including increase in
driving, improvement in health care and socioeconomic factors.
Also worth pointing out in Figure 8, in the U.S. we see that the cycling fatality rate
decreases after 1990. This marks a cycling renaissance when bicycle infrastructure became more
popular and funding was increasingly used towards those improvements (42, 43). Infrastructure
change, from increased facilities to improved design alternatives, might be an important factor
that may have contributed to the different safety paths the two countries reflect in their
vulnerable user fatality rates. The recent declining trend in the cycling fatality rate is very
positive in that it indicates that the U.S. is moving in the right direction on that front. On a less
positive note, we can see the poor state of safety for pedestrians in the U.S. as well as the
worsening situation with the recent spike since 2009. The U.S. pedestrian risk warrants attention
because it remained relatively flat and high in magnitude through the 80s, 90s and early 2000s.
The late 2000s saw a slight decline, but nothing long-term as recent years present an increase
back to earlier risk levels.

7. Discussion
In addition to the many factors identified in the literature review that affect road safety,
this discussion brings out aspects specific to infrastructure, policies, and safety culture. It is
likely that the larger rate of decline for the Netherlands versus the slower one in the United
States was influenced by the approaches taken in terms of those factors. By looking at what the
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Netherlands did in those areas we might see how safety conditions improved for vulnerable
users.

7.1. Pre-1970s: Decline in Cycling
There were significant declines in cycling just after WWII when the economy in the
Netherlands was improving, disposable incomes were quickly increasing, and motorization grew
(44). In the U.S. cities and towns were building in a way that encouraged car use and
discouraged biking. For the Netherlands the bicycle was growing in use through 1960, but during
the 60s it became less common as people switched to automobiles (44). Some reasons that may
have contributed to this switch were the changes in spatial patterns. New residential areas were
expanding further from the city center, population densities declined as people moved away, and
what resulted were longer commutes for which the bicycle became less viable (44). In the U.S.
similar patterns occurred with increased sprawl and longer commute distances. That likely
played at least some part in why cycling lost favor in the U.S. as well. Furthermore, bicycle
traffic was neglected in national policies and visions for future development, while the
automobile received greater attention (44), for both countries. Political officials, in Amsterdam
for example, sometimes looked down on cycling and even thought it to be primitive in the early
70s (45, pp. 358-360). It was in the late 1970s when transportation policy finally started planning
with the bicycle in mind in the Netherlands (44).

7.2. 1970s: Economic Turmoil and Protests
Both countries had their peak fatalities in 1972 followed by sharp drops the following
years. This coincides with the 1973 Oil Embargo, an occurrence that affected nations worldwide.
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This socioeconomic factor appears to have impacted the Netherlands and the U.S. similarly in
terms of their road fatality declines. In response, both nations made cutbacks during those years
on automobile usage to account for the fuel deficit. In the U.S. they reduced the highway speed
limit to 55mph (88 kmph) and set various gas purchase limits (46). In the Netherlands the
government implemented “Car-Free Sundays” in order to ration oil (41). This action had an
effect on the public perception of automobile use and alternative modes. Car owning residents
saw that there were other means of transport, and anti-car protesters, who fought for their right to
cycle, finally saw the bicycle regain popularity for daily travel. The increase and decrease in gas
prices during the 70s were different for the Netherlands and U.S. and Ahangari’s work
demonstrates some of those gas price changes in regards to safety. It is worth noting that there
may have also been more or less willingness to look at non-motorized alternatives as a solution
to safety due to the different effects from gas prices.
One particular protest was “Stop de Kindermoord,” which translates to “Stop the child
murder.” It gained momentum in 1972 and was comprised of groups of children and parents
fighting for their right to safe streets (41). These children were fighting for their overall road
safety, but also for their right to play in the street. Given the density in urban spaces, often the
streets are the play areas, which increase the exposure to road fatalities (47). In the U.S. no
protests of similar magnitude came from the public, but rather the U.S. was dealing with
pushback from the auto industry against attempts at implementing automobile safety standards
(48). The occurrence of the Dutch protests around the time of the Oil Embargo has often been
suggested as the influencing factor that altered the government’s approach towards future
transportation policy planning. Changing the way of thinking about safety among the political
influencers was a key milestone. Pete Jordan talks about the political influencers in Amsterdam’s
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history during the time of these protests. He mentions their shift in thinking about cycling and
safety in response to those public actions (45). Public engagements, such as the protests, appear
to have been essential tactics in changing the views of politicians who were too enthralled with
the automobile being a symbol of progress to see the devastating decline in safety. These
government influencers could then give way for the changing views among transportation and
planning professionals. Targeting political figures can result in direct and even immediate
changes through policies, which as a result spur progress for changing street design over a longer
period.

7.3. 1970s – 1990s: A Turn in Policy and Infrastructure
Prior to the 1970s, the existing cycling traffic and infrastructure was not often planned or
even considered in policies for the U.S. or Netherlands. It is not surprising then that nonmotorized modes as well as public transport lost their dominance across the two countries. After
fatalities peaked and the Dutch public protested in the 1970s, the national government became
aware of the negative outcomes that arise from an auto dependent system. Officials began
supporting policies that promoted walking, cycling, and public transport. They began to consider
the importance of alternative modes in transportation planning. The government increasingly
started funding those areas of transport more, while removing some of the focus from
automobiles (44). Additionally, road safety goals were also integrated into transport policies. The
first Transport Structure Plan in 1987 in the Netherlands called for a 25% decrease in fatalities
by 2000 than there were in 1985 (49). This goal, in fact, was achieved as police registered
fatalities show a 24.8% decline over that period. The Second Transport Structure Plan in 1990
took things further by setting 50% fewer fatalities by 2010 than were in 1986 as the new goal
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(49). This goal was not only attained but also surpassed as police registered fatalities show a
64.8% decline. The second transport plan had set out target goals to discourage automobile use
and encourage other modes. Also crucial in helping cyclists get better facilities during this time
period was the creation of the Cyclists’ Union (De Fietsersbond) in 1975 (44). This organization
fought for cyclists’ rights and promoted infrastructure projects that support safer and increased
cycling as it still does today.
When it comes to new safe road designs, the Dutch have been inclined to perform
demonstration projects supported by the central government, and then implement those results
throughout the country. In particular we will mention traffic calming (residential zones) and
cycle route planning during the 1970s-90s. In order to test the effectiveness of traffic calming
and the woonerf design, which literally translates to “living yard”, the Dutch government funded
a demonstration project in 1976 ultimately selecting two districts as test facilities. Organized as
an experiment with control sites and varying design options for the test sites, they studied the
effects of traffic controls on car volumes, speeds, overall living conditions, as well as traffic
crashes. Data were collected before and after the reclassification and reconstruction of the streets
and network. The study found that creating slow zones across an area showed positive results for
safety, therefore area wide traffic calming gained popularity in other parts of the country (50).
Another infrastructure design inquiry was for cycle routes and creating cycle network
plans. Demonstration projects on cycle routes took place in Tilburg and The Hague around 1976.
They showed some positive results on how people perceived safety. Further testing the effects of
a cycle network at the city, district, and local street levels was performed in Delft in the 1980s.
That study showed varying results about route choices, mode share, and safety (51). Overall, the
numerous demonstration projects initiated by the national government had hoped to stimulate
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new design projects in other municipalities. For infrastructure, this time period was about
growing the knowledge base for design alternatives that could support the new ideals set forth in
the policies on safety and transport.
In the U.S. during the 1970s through 1980s policy was still limited to improving road
safety through vehicle technology and highway design. Focus remained around the automobile.
The turn in policies and legislation for the U.S. occurred around the 1990s and onward. One of
the first tentative efforts to be more inclusive of alternative modes at the Federal level was the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (63). In 1998 the state of Maryland,
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) hosted a workshop, “Thinking Beyond the Pavement” (64).
This along with “Flexibility in Highway Design” published in 1997 by FHWA introduced the
idea of context sensitive design (65). Also at the federal level, though more recently, is the DOT
Strategic Plan 2012-2016 where the U.S. started promoting public transit and non-motorized
modes as a means of improving safety (52). All these federal steps opened the door for
opportunities like: a street design manual prioritizing sustainability goals published by the
Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) and Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) in 2006
(66), several design guides from the National Association of City Transportation Officials
(NACTO), and numerous complete streets guides at the city level. Despite the recent progress,
more concerned national level support, earlier than the 1990s, might have had the ability to push
policy at the state and local levels towards more progressive planning sooner.
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7.4. 1990s – Present: Sustainable Safety
For the Netherlands, their current safety system approach is called Sustainable Safety.
Numerous Dutch papers extensively discuss Sustainable Safety, but the key elements to repeat
are the five principles and the idea of considering the human as the fundamental unit of
measurement. The five principles this vision operates under are:
1. Functionality of roads
2. Homogeneity of speed, direction of travel, and mass
3. Predictability of road design
4. Forgivingness of the environment and of road users
5. State awareness by the road user
It is important to notice that four of the five Sustainable Safety principles are tied to the physical
design of the infrastructure. Infrastructure is an important element for road safety because it has
the opportunity to alter user behavior; therefore improvements to design may be effective
preventative measures (53, 54). The basic consideration for the human being is about considering
the physical tolerance of the body, human error, and reckless driving behavior as faults in the
system (55). The traffic system should correct for these vulnerable points through legislation,
infrastructure, enforcement, etc. However, this type of thinking takes a certain kind of shift, a
shift from the more classical reactive hotspot approach, to the proactive systems thinking.
Prior to the 1990s the Netherlands was solving traffic safety problems in a reactive
manner addressing individual problems as they became aware of high-risk issues (67). This is
essentially the approach used in the United States today. For example, the 1987 “Long Term
Plan for Traffic Safety” had a number of “spearheads” aimed at addressing specific road safety
pitfalls to tackle the overall death reduction goal of 25% fewer by 2000. Spearheads can be
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understood as focal groups or target elements of transportation with high risks that need to be
addressed through various measures (56). While this approach is an effort at reducing casualties,
it lacks overall in making continuous progress because it does not address the route cause of
fatalities (49). Spearheads do not inspire a comprehensive understanding of road safety. Over
time, high-risk issues diminish and become harder to identify. Risk to certain users becomes
smaller and hotspot locations are harder to find as crashes appear distributed across the system
rather than in clusters (67). A more sustainable road safety practice is having a comprehensive
understanding of what causes a road fatality, as demonstrated by the comprehensive conceptual
framework (18). The Netherlands began developing the Sustainable Safety vision in 1991,
initially announcing a start-up version in 1997, and a fully updated vision in 2005 (56).
Sustainable Safety is a way of thinking about road safety proactively and systematically.
In Sustainable Safety, to prevent fatalities, the traffic system should adapt to human
behavior so that the possibility of a crash diminishes, and if a crash does occur, the speeds are
not so high that the collision results in fatality. By studying the connections between the traffic
environment, vehicles, and user behavior, conditions for likely conflicts may be identified and
design solutions implemented to enforce safe behaviors. There are many studies that show
certain design elements promote safer or more dangerous behaviors, such as speeding (57, 58,
59). Sustainable Safety sets out much of this theory as the foundation for constructing their
vision principles. Those principles are then translated into design approaches. Similar to when
the Netherlands studied bike routes and traffic calming several years ago, the central government
once again initiated demonstration projects, this time to test the Sustainable Safety vision design
principles (55). One example of design influenced by theory is user separation, partly based on
differences of speed. Where there are high-speed roads, separate infrastructure is created for
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cyclist to remove potential conflict points. Alternatively, when speeds are very low, users may
share the roadway such as on local residential streets (8). Another application of theory is that
increased speeds lead to an increased chance of dying upon impact between a vehicle and
vulnerable user (60). This emphasizes the body’s tolerance for speed as a design limitation,
which leads to using specific speeds for different street contexts to reduce severity outcomes.

8. Conclusion
As the U.S. takes steps towards reducing their fatality trends, it is essential to
acknowledge where there is room for improvement. A committee comprised of various national
stakeholders launched “Towards Zero Deaths” in the U.S., a guide for road safety strategies (68).
Additionally there have been numerous “Vision Zero” programs start up in U.S. cities; all which
seek to embrace the switch to systems based road safety emerging worldwide (61). In order to
further the impacts of these programs though, it is important to learn from countries that have
established systems-based approaches to incorporate fundamental ideas. The Netherlands was
one of the first to both realize a need for and to develop a systematic safety approach. With it,
they were successful in reducing overall road fatalities, and especially in building a
transportation system that decreases the vulnerability to cyclists and pedestrians. Most notably is
that risk has converged to the point that cars, pedestrians, and cyclists experience equal risk after
accounting for number of users.
When comparing the Sustainable Safety vision and the U.S. approach in Towards Zero
Deaths, one particular lesson stands out as important for a continuous reduction in fatalities, both
overall and for vulnerable users. Sustainable safety explicitly states the willingness in the
Netherlands to accept that reducing fatalities is a difficult task, and one that becomes harder to
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tackle the further fatalities drop. Thus, they show more willingness to try new solutions (8). The
U.S. principles seem to acknowledge that fatalities are a serious issue, but not that the next step
forward may be more difficult and require changing old methods. To get over future hurdles may
mean doing politically unpopular things like replacing high automobile speeds with slower safer
ones necessary for vulnerable users, or even removing car access altogether on select streets.
The Netherlands has overcome several challenges to create an environment today that
makes vulnerable users just as safe as car users as measured with respect to fatalities per user.
With conscious efforts put to improve safety for the most vulnerable road users, the risk to all
road users has dropped. The risk metric used in this paper is one that accounts for the number of
users exposed. The risk values, fatalities per 100,000 users, are 3.0 for cyclists, 2.7 for
pedestrians, and 2.5 for cars in the Netherlands. That is 1.2 and 1.08 times higher risk to cyclists
and pedestrians than car. The literature supports this pattern of a declining risk to all users (29).
However, in the U.S., vulnerable users are still indeed extremely vulnerable by comparison to
cars when we account for the amount of users. Those risks, fatalities per 100,000 users, are 59.8
for pedestrians, 42.5 for cyclists, and 8.2 for cars. That is 7.3 and 5.2 times higher risk to
pedestrians and cyclists than cars. Trip length is potentially something to look further into.
Particularly to see if urban, typically shorter trips, versus rural, typically longer trips, for each of
the three modes in both countries still show the same converging or diverging patterns as the
overall trends in Figure 8.
The findings in this paper support Wegman’s statements on “awareness in numbers” and
the need for risk reducing measures (28). That it is not just an increase in numbers that has made
vulnerable road users in the Netherlands safer. We show that the safety trends for different
modes correlate with changes to infrastructure, a key risk reducing measure. Safe facilities and
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design are crucial to building a transportation system where vulnerable users have a high
presence on the streets while simultaneously being as safe as all users. The nature of the
Netherlands system has made it so that you no longer need armor to survive on the street.
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